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Abstract 
In much research about the role of ideas in politics, ideas as explanatory variables are often left undertheorized. Often policy studies focusing on ideas do not conceptualise ideas as dynamic units, whose internal structure matters for political actors. Instead, ideas are implicitly analysed as monolithic units. In opposition to this perspective on ideas, we argue that ideas need to be studied as dynamic units that develop over time, and in relation to actors and other ideas. With this perspective on the nature of ideas, it is possible to see the relationship between ideas and actors as dynamic and open-ended: actors can use different strategies to affect ideas to work in their interest, but ideas have a life of their own and are never fully controllable. Analysing the case of the Danish jobcentre reform it is demonstrated how ideas may be introduced by actors in order to promote their interests, but once in play, actors are no longer able to fully control their development. Thus, to understand how ideas matter in politics, it is necessary to appreciate the importance of conceptualising the nature of ideas.
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Introduction

The recent upsurge in studies of how 'ideas matter' has created at least one point of consensus, namely that ideas do matter. This assertion is so broadly accepted that Rueschemeyer (2006) in a review of why and how ideas matter, starts out by stating: "That ideas matter in politics is beyond question" (p. 227). Of course, the question still remains how important ideas are compared to other factors shaping social processes. If we accept that ideas are an important factor in social change - and a great many studies would support this belief (to name a few: Bèland, 2005; Bèland and Waddan, 2007; Blyth, 2002; Cox, 2001; Daguerre and Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Hall, 1993; Goul Andersen and Albrekt Larsen, 2008; Marx Ferree, 2003; Radaelli and Schmidt, 2004; Schmidt, 2002, 2005; Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2007; Somers and Block, 2005; Walsh, 2000) – we are still left with the question of how ideas actually matter. In this paper we focus on how actors can use ideas as weapons and try to demonstrate the dynamic relationship between actors and ideas.
Despite the great interest in the political significance of ideas, not much work theorises directly about questions relating to the nature of ideas: What are ideas? How do they work? What is it about ideas that make them politically significant? How do ideas develop over time? What is the relationship between ideas and actors, exogenous factors or perhaps other ideas? And how is changing ideas related to political change? Instead ideas are used more or less implicitly as ‘think-patterns’, ‘belief’, ‘cognition’, ‘blue-prints’, ‘framing’, etc., and the analyses are conducted without further explorations of the internal structure of the ideas.
When ideas are not analysed as social objects in their own right, there is a tendency of emphasizing the role ideas play in creating stability rather than change. In ideational analyses, political change is normally explained with a change of actor or exogenous factors, but the internal structure of ideas is rarely ascribed an explanatory role in these processes. This in turn has the effect that primary explanatory power is placed with actors, because actors are the main promoters of ideas. If we do not engage directly with ideas, it is impossible to find out, how the relation between actors and ideas work. The lack of theorizing about the nature of ideas leads us to understand actors as ‘bearers’ of ideas as opposed to a more dynamic relation between ideas and actors. This paper’s focus on the internal structure of ideas is part of an effort to show a more direct relation between ideas, actors and policy that we believe previous analyses have lacked.
Below we elaborate more fully on our ideational approach, but for now it will suffice to point to three characteristics of ideas that we focus on in this paper: 1) The meaning of an idea does not derive from a core, but instead from relations of meaning in a network of ideas. This means that an idea can change meaning over time  if it is recombined with other ideas; 2) ideas are historically embedded, which puts a limit on whicht ideas can meaningfully be related to each other in a network of ideas; 3) and ideas and concepts are created with a semantic openness towards certain ideas over others. This is another limit on which ideas can meaningfully be combined in a network, a limit that to a large extent is determined by the original creator and proponent of an idea.
When these characteristics of ideas are taken into consideration, we are able to see how there exists a dynamic relationship between ideas and actors. Because the meaning of an idea is not given from a core but instead from its relation to other ideas, the meaning of an idea can change over time, when the idea is associated with new ideas. Thus, the meaning of an idea can never be controlled by its original creator, because ideas work dynamically and often change over time. However, two diachronic aspects of ideas limit the possibility of changing the meaning of ideas. First, the ideational environment of the polity makes certain interpretation of an idea more plausible than others, which means that ideas cannot be reassociated as actors see fit. Second, an idea is more or less semantically open for certain interpretations, which also limits the range of possibilities for combining the idea with another idea. In other words, there exists a dynamic relationship between actors and ideas with both possibilities and limits for the actors.
To demonstrate the theoretical strengths of our approach we use the Danish jobcentre reform as an empirical illustration. As part of a major restructuring of the Danish public sector (Strukturreformen – The Danish Structural Reform) jobcentres were established in Denmark in January 2007. The jobcentre reform created a new structure for employment service where ‘one-stop shops’ carry out servicing and control (mediation of labour, activation schemes, visitation, job guidance and job plans, control that the unemployed are at the disposal of the labour market) of all unemployed people. Before the Jobcentre Reform, employment service was divided between the state and the municipalities. The latter carried out employment service for unemployed people on social assistance – people without unemployment insurance, while the former serviced people on unemployment benefits – people with unemployment insurance. With the jobcentre-reform the previous two-tier employment service system was united into a one-tier system, where jobcentres handle both insured and uninsured clients [1]. 
The negotiations between the Liberal-Conservative government and the Social Democratic led opposition were focused on who should have the overall responsibility for the jobcentres in the new structure – the municipalities or the state [2]. What was not up for discussion, however, was the question of whether a one-tier structure was preferable or not. The agenda setting process had led to an agreement between government and opposition that a one-tier system was preferable to the existing two-tier structure [3]. This marks an interesting break with the previous Social Democratic position that the two systems should be kept apart in a two-tier structure. In our empirical analysis we ask how it was possible to reach consensus between the leading government party, Venstre, and the leading opposition party, the Social Democrats, that a one-tier structure was preferable to a two-tier structure. We argue that it is not possible to explain the consensus using normal interest oriented theories. Instead, it is necessary to analyse how the organising ideas in the jobcentre-reform were coupled to create a reform acceptable to both government and opposition. The case analysis demonstrates how the relationship between ideas and actors is dynamic. Ideas are never entirely given, nor at the full disposal of actors. Instead, ideas are made as they are used: their meaning depends both on how actors use them, the idea’s relation to other ideas and the ideational background of the policy field.

The theoretical argument

If we want to understand how actors could use ideas as weapons in the agenda setting process of the Danish jobcentre reform, it is necessary to create a theoretical framework that can analyse the relationship between actors and ideas. In our conceptualisation of the nature of ideas, we draw on the work of political theorist Michael Freeden (1996). Freeden's theories cannot be directly applied to policy analysis, because his theoretical framework is created to analyse ideologies. However, we draw on important theoretical observations to construct an argument about how ideas work and what political significance this has. An important strength in using Freeden in our analysis is that we too believe that ideas, discourse and text should be analysed as social facts that play a dynamic role in political life.  In both our theoretical and empirical analysis we engage directly with the concrete manifestations of ideas as central explanatory variables to determine how ideas develop over time and in relation to other ideas. In this context Freeden (1996) provides us with a helpful theoretical framework to guide our analysis.

The nature of ideas

As mentioned in the introduction, we focus on three aspects of the nature of ideas: The historical embeddedness of ideas; where the meaning of an idea originates; and the semantic openness of ideas to other ideas. First, ideas are always built on the foundation of older ideas, creating a high degree of ideational path dependency. This point is analogous to the argument among ‘ideas matter’-theorists that ideas are historically embedded (Bèland, forthcoming; Cox, 2001, 2004; Hay, 2006). The conceptual approach holds that ideas and concepts should always be studied over time, owing to the great possibility of path dependence. What seems conceptually natural now, may originate from a whole different understanding of problems and solutions. Ideas need to be fitted to existing ideational streams, which often makes it necessary to appropriate new policy ideas to the dominating policy tradition. This also means that there exists a dynamic relationship between new and old ideas: The process of coupling the two changes both ideas. Moreover, the path dependence of ideas has the effect that certain ideas are historically favoured, something which actors have to take into consideration, if they want their policy ideas to succeed. 
Second, the meaning of an idea does not derive from a core. Ideas are normally conceptualised as containing a core that determines the meaning of the idea. Like discourse theory, and in opposition to traditional analyses of political ideology, Freeden (1996) breaks with the notion that the meaning of ideas derives from a core. Instead, ideas function like words in a sentence: The meaning of a word is created from its relation to the rest of the words in a sentence. Freeden (1996) argues that rather than thinking of an ideological  core, it would be more fitting to talk of a cluster of ideas that through their interrelation creates meaning in the concept (p. 84). By the same token, "political concepts acquire meaning...through their particular location within a constellation of other political concepts" (Freeden, 1996: 54). This means that if an idea is removed or added to an already existing constellation of ideas, it can have significant effect both on the meaning of the idea in question and the meaning of the components of the already existing network of ideas. 
Finally, ideas are more or less semantically open to other ideas. This means that though an idea can principally be coupled with any other idea, an idea is more open towards some ideas than others. In the case of the Danish jobcentre reform, the idea of an individualised effort for all unemployed showed itself to be semantically open to the idea that what kind of help unemployed people receive, should be based on what best helps the individual, rather than what administrative box the unemployed belongs to. Ideas are never fully controllable, not even by those actors who invented them. 
Some ideas are very fixed; others have very open and fluid boundaries and tend to be highly sensitive to the environment (Freeden, 1996: 72-73). The meaning of a particular idea is not completely fixed, thus rival actors can change its meaning by coupling it with other ideas. 

“Some elements (...) can be swallowed up whole to form part of the concept we are initially examining, or they can be cannibalized for useful parts” (Freeden, 1996: 67)

The structural openness of an idea also stems from the cultural and political setting the general political system is part of. The semantic direction of the interpretative openness is not least due to specific historical and cultural phenomena that encourage the association of certain political concepts (Freeden, 1996: 72-73).

The nature of ideas and its political significance

It is probably helpful analytically to distinguish between two types of actors (though in practice they overlap): On one side the original creator of an idea, and on the other side rival actors, who have an interest in challenging the meaning of the idea. The original creator is in a privileged position, even though the meaning of an idea cannot be controlled. The greatest privilege obviously consists in the ability of the actor to present a new idea and choose what network of ideas he wants to place his idea in. In this way the original creator has a first-mover advantage in framing the idea and has heavy influence on the future semantic openness of the idea. Still, the original creator is limited by the fact that the idea has to be fitted to an existing network of ideas, as well as the more general ideational structure of the policy area. Put briefly, then: though the original creator of an idea can heavily influence the meaning of the idea he creates, as well as affect the future development of the idea, he cannot fully control its meaning.
On the other side, rival actors are left with a second-mover possibility of affecting the meaning of an idea. This means that in the process of trying to change the meaning of an idea, they have to refer to an already existing network of ideas. We have already noted that the meaning of an idea derives from the network of ideas it is part of. Thus, to change the meaning of an idea, the rival actor has to change the network of ideas that gives meaning to the idea. This can be done by injecting a new idea into an existing network of ideas, thus changing the meaning of the ideas. For example, the idea of individualisation could be coupled with either a state-friendly idea or a state-hostile idea (e.g. 'to individualise the effort to help the unemployed, we need a free market of unemployment services, rather than state bureaucracy'), which would significantly influence the political meaning of the idea of individualised unemployment service. 
To take another example from labour market policy: When New Labour came to power, it decided to uphold the Conservative’s focus on motivating the unemployed with the use of negative incentives. Building on this existing conservative heritage, however, New Labour injected the idea of individualisation. In this way the Conservative’s idea of individualisation as a matter of incentives changed meaning and was adopted by New Labour to focus more broadly on employability (see Finn, 2003). In other words, ideas may change meaning by being associated or coupled with other ideas.
One of the strengths in using this strategy is that the opponent’s ideas are used, which legitimizes the new idea injected into the network of ideas. The result is that the original idea changes meaning, possibly without alienating the original creator of the idea. Put simply, the strategy aims at changing the meaning of existing ideas in to challenge the viability of the problem definitions and solutions the idea proposes
Obviously there are limits to this tactic of changing ideas by coupling them to new ones. First, not just any idea can be injected into the existing network of ideas. The idea that the rival actor wishes to fuse with the network has to be related to the existing ideas and the general ideational framework of the polity. An example can be drawn from the Danish jobcentre reform. As part of the reform private actors were given the opportunity to supply employment service to unemployed people. However, to maintain the support of the Social Democrats – and to fit the idea into the ideational tradition of Danish labour market policy – it was necessary to maintain a privileged position for labour unions by letting them offer their services on the market. In this way the Liberal-Conservative government was limited in its use of liberal ideas as weapons (Carstensen and Pedersen, 2008). The necessity of fitting new ideas to existing ideational traditions makes the strategy of coupling ideas inherently conservative. However, it also works effectively in creating agreement between actors, and possibly persuading the original creator of the idea to accept the new meaning. 
Second, just like it was the case with the original creator of the idea, rival actors cannot control the meaning of ideas. The rival actor can try to inject a new idea into an existing network – for example try to inject the idea that a private market delivers the best employment service into a network of ideas about active labour market policy – but it cannot control the process. In the end, the meaning of the ideas may develop in a direction envisioned neither by the original creator or the rival actor. In short, ideas have a life of their own that is not wholly determinable by actors. Finally, not just any actor can change the meaning of an idea. Often it is necessary to occupy a powerful position in society, though this in no way ensures ideational power. In other words, in the political struggle over ideas, normally only actors in politically powerful positions play a role, but the success of an idea cannot be determined from the proponent's institutional position.
Thus, it is possible to identify a mix of limits and possibilities when using ideas as a weapon. Both actors and rival actors can affect the meaning of an idea as it fits their interests, and in this way they create each others’ limits: The creator of the idea limits the possibilities of rival actors by making the idea semantically open towards certain ideas, and the rival actors makes it impossible for the creator of the idea to control the meaning of the idea. Another limit on the use of ideas that affects all actors is that new ideas have to be translated into existing ideational streams to gain support and legitimacy. Ideas do not exist in a vacuum, thus actors cannot achieve their goals without appropriating their ideas or conceptions to already existing networks of ideas. 

Empirical analysis

In our theoretical argument we focused on how analytical benefit may be reaped from analysing ideas as a central variable in reform processes. We also argued that it is necessary to study ideas simultaneously from a diachronic and synchronic perspective. In our empirical analysis we analyse the agenda setting process of the Danish jobcentre reform. Specifically, we ask how it was possible for the Social Democrats and the Liberal-Conservative government to reach consensus on the appropriateness of a one-tier structure, considering that the Social Democrats had previously strongly opposed such a policy, and that it was not in their immediate interest, because a one-tier structure would limit the power of the unions in Danish labour market policy. The aim of the empirical analysis is two-fold: First, to demonstrate how a greater focus on the nature of ideas can help to explain the agenda setting process in policy reforms. Second, we aim to demonstrate how actors’ use of ideas is characterised by both possibilities as well as structural limits for the actors. Thus, we argue that it is necessary to take the nature of ideas into account, when we analyse how ideas matter in policy reforms.
The empirical analysis is divided in three parts. First we conceptualise the Danish jobcentre reform from an ideational perspective, asking: What ideas organise the government’s argumentation for the jobcentre reform? The reason why is straight forward: If we want to study ideas, we need to know the internal, discursive workings of the ideas. Second, we analyse how the agreement on a one-tier structure was reached. This is the diachronic and synchronic part of the analysis, where we analyse how the ideas represented in the jobcentre reform developed over time and were coupled to each other in a network of meaning. In the last part of the empirical analysis, we ask what factors made it possible to reach agreement on a one-tier structure.

Conceptualising the Danish jobcentre reform

We analyse the Danish jobcentres as a network of ideas rather than a piece of legislation or a physical unit. The aim of the first part of the empirical analysis, the conceptualisation of jobcentres, is to extract from central documents what (Danish) actors mean, when they speak of jobcentres. In our theoretical argument we focus on how ideas develop over time and in relation to other ideas. We argue that the jobcentre reform was built around two ideas: 1) individualisation and 2) equal status of the unemployed regardless of insurance status. The jobcentre-concept is derived from two central policy papers: the first reform that suggested a united one-tier system, 'Flere i arbejde' (More people working) (Government, 2002), and the government's initial proposal for the negotiations for a jobcentre-reform, 'Det nye Danmark' (The New Denmark) (Government, 2004).

Idea 1: Individualisation

It has become a common tendency in several EU countries to use the idea of individualisation in labour market policy. The individualisation takes different shapes, but a majority of the OECD countries are trying to personalise their employment services (van Berkel and Valkenburg, 2007; see also Newman, 2007, Newman and Clarke, 2007, Bothfield, 2008). In the Danish jobcentre reform, the idea of individualisation is based on the belief that unemployed people have individual abilities, strengths and motivation. The key to reintegration is to stimulate these resources through incentives, education and individual job plans. It is clear that the Liberal-Conservative government believes that the needs of the individual are central for reintegration.

“The reintegration efforts should be determined by the needs of the unemployed, rather than whether the unemployed is insured or not. The system must be adjusted to the individual, not the other way around” (Government, 2002a: 1; authors’ translation). 

There is strong emphasis on individual needs in the Danish jobcentre reform [4]. 

“The effort to employ people should be based on the needs and resources of the individual, not which ‘cash-register’ he belongs to (Government, 2004: 13, authors’ translation). 

The existing two-tier structure is criticised for being either too focused on social problems of the unemployed, instead of trying to find work; or too focused on getting the client work without trying to solve social problems. The effort should instead be focused around the needs of the individual by making it possible to combine social- and employment-oriented efforts. The one-tier structure it thought to make these different focuses go hand in hand. This is a central goal since “social and economic problems are connected, and must therefore be solved in parallel” (Government, 2004: 32; authors’ translation).

Idea 2: Equal status of the unemployed

The idea of “Equal status of the unemployed” is based on the notion that here are equally strong and weak clients among insured and uninsured clients. Thus, the two-tier structured division between them has historic rather than employment‐related reasons. This has been a central argument for a unified employment service in Denmark. Given that there is a likeness between insured and uninsured clients, why then have two systems dealing with the same kind of clients? The Liberal-Conservative government has on several occasions argued that the supposed difference between insured and uninsured clients is an illusion. 
According to the government, the AF (the state-controlled Danish employment service for insured clients) and the municipalities respectively are not able to deal with the combination of socially oriented and work-related problems that clients encounter. The municipalities cannot handle unemployed people without social problems. The state on the other hand is not able to help clients with social problems effectively enough, but focus all their effort on getting people a job (Government, 2002a: 9, 10; 2002b: 17, 18):

 “In both AF [that handles insured clients] and the municipalities [that handle uninsured clients] there are people caught in the system. And in both systems there are persons who by their own help find a job. In reality you cannot divide the unemployed into a strong group of insured and a weak group of uninsured” (Government, 2004: 15, authors’ translation). 

The starting point for employment service should be the same for everybody and differences in measures are to be determined by individual needs not insurance status. To bring the argument to a head: everybody is different, thus everybody is alike.

The ideas combined

When the two ideas, 'Individual needs' and 'Equal status of the unemployed' is combined we see a strong argument for a one-tier system: When determining how to best help clients, this should be decided from the perspective of the individual's resources and motivation, not from his insurance status. The clients within the two systems are more or less experiencing the same problems, so there is no reason to uphold a two-tier system. The idea 'Individual needs' does not in itself support a one-tier system, but when combined with 'Equal status of the unemployed' the conclusion is straight forward: Unemployment is best combated in a one-tier system.

How was consensus reached?

Now that the two organising ideas in the Danish jobcentre reform has been identified, it is possible to analyse what role the two ideas played in creating agreement between the Liberal-Conservative government and the Social Democratic opposition. In our analysis of how consensus was reached that a one-tier structure was preferable to the existing two-tier structure, we focus on the position of the leading opposition party, the Social Democrats, and the leading government party, Venstre. The position of the two parties on the ideas of ‘Individualisation’ and ‘Equal status of the unemployed’ is analysed in turn. By analysing the position of the two parties we are able to follow the developing agreement between government and opposition, and analyse how ideational processes played an important role herein.

The two ideas and the position of the Social Democrats

The two ideas – ‘Individualisation’ and ‘Equal status of the unemployed’ – were in no way equally well represented in the Social Democratic position during the 1990s. Individualisation played a prominent role, whereas the idea that there is no fundamental difference between insured and uninsured clients was not accepted by the Social Democrats before consensus was reached in 2003.
The idea of individualisation goes back some time in Danish employment policy, at least to the beginning of the 1990’s. The Social Democratic version of the idea of ‘Individualisation’ was developed in the Zeuthen Commission (1992) that served as a blueprint for the later Social Democratic labour market reforms [5]. One could argue that the individualisation of unemployment forms the basis of the commission’s recommendations. The idea of individualising the employment service was fully accepted by the Social Democratic government, and it plays a central part in the reforms of the 1990s. Important policy instruments were the job plan as well as an increased flexibility in the activation of the unemployed to accommodate the needs of the individual (Larsen and Langager, 1998). The idea of individualisation thus became a fundamental Social Democratic idea in the Danish labour market policy of the 1990s. As we saw above, it also served as an organising idea in the Danish jobcentre reform about 10 years after it was introduced to Danish labour market policy.
The idea of ‘Equal status of unemployed’ played a very different role for the Social Democrats and Danish labour market policy in the 1990s. The question of insurance-status was not even a subject of discussion in the Zeuthen-commission, as the commission only dealt with one of the two tiers, namely unemployment benefits for insured clients. Thus, the question of insurance status was not an issue in the Social Democratic labour market reforms of the 1990s, and the Social Democrats originally opposed the idea that insured and uninsured clients were alike. However, the preferences of the Social Democratic Party underwent a significant change around 2003 (when the party was in opposition), where the chairman of the party at that time, Mogens Lykketoft, acknowledged the necessity of a one-tier system. The idea of ‘Equal status of the unemployed’ is placed centrally in his argument: 

“We need to unite the measures to combat unemployment for all unemployed so they are treated uniformly and get the same offers for employment and education, regardless of whether you are insured or not.” (cited from Boddum and Dalhoff, 2003; authors’ translation).

With this change in the Social Democratic position, a consensus emerges that the Danish labour market should be organised in one tier for both insured and uninsured clients. In other words, with the jobcentre reform two ideas are combined that the Social Democrats have not before believed to be connected. When the Social Democrats argued for individualisation in the 1990s it was not connected to the question of a one- or two-tier structure. When the idea ‘Individualisation’ was coupled to the idea of ‘Equal status of the unemployed’ it led the Social Democrats to an agreement with the Liberal-Conservative government that a one-tier structure was preferable.

The two ideas and the position of Venstre

As already mentioned, the tendency to individualise the re-integration measures, is broader than just the Danish case. It is a tendency permeating much of the OECD-countries’ labour market policy, but there are differences in what is focused on. Broadly speaking, there are two forms of individualisation: One that focuses on the employability of the unemployed, seeking to upgrade their qualifications; and another that focuses on the incentives of the unemployed, aiming at ‘making work pay’. Though they have borrowed from both perspectives, the Danish Social Democrats have been inspired mostly by the former, and the Danish Liberal-Conservative parties have primarily found inspiration in the latter. This was also the case with Venstre in the 1990s. They focused mostly on how to ‘make work pay’ and to make the employment system and the benefit structure less bureaucratic (see e.g. Venstre, 1996). This is obviously a very thin form of individualisation compared to the Social Democratic human capital approach.
The Liberal-Conservative government that came to power in 2001 maintained the individualisation in employment policy, but somewhat changed the Social Democratic focus on human capital/development to a more classic Liberal-Conservative workfare. Thus, eligibility criteria and requirements to take available jobs were tightened, and benefits were cut for certain groups. With its focus on finding ‘the shortest road to employment’, the Danish Liberal-Conservative government pushed employment policy towards workfare rather than human capital and the upgrading of skills. However, the Liberal-Conservative government was not able to tighten eligibility rules or benefits to the extent that they would have wished (Goul Andersen and Albrekt Larsen, 2004). Thus, the discourse represented in the idea ‘Individualisation’ is taken from the conception of individualisation developed by the Social Democrats during the 1990s. This is an example on how new policy ideas can be build on previous ideas to support its legitimacy.
In contrast to the Social Democrats, Venstre has for a long time argued for a one tier structure. Venstre’s position on the idea of ‘Equal status of the unemployed’ has been clear through the 1990s: Venstre has supported the establishment of a one-tier labour market policy, not only regarding employment service, but also a one-tier benefit structure. There are many examples of this support. In 1995, MP for Venstre, Lars Løkke Rasmussen[6], expresses his frustration with the existing two-tier system, where the municipalities spend more time trying to avoid paying social benefits than getting people work, and claims that often it is accidental who are insured and who are not (Rasmussen, 1995). In other words - in Venstre the idea 'Equal status of the unemployed' has already been somewhat fused in 1995, and naturally the argument supports a one-tier system.
Another example can be found in 1996, when senior members of Venstre – notably Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who would in 2001 become Prime Mister – produced a policy paper suggesting a reform of the benefit structure (Venstre, 1996). The policy paper argues that all unemployed should be covered by the same rules, and that a benefit similar to Jobseeker’s Allowance should replace existing benefits and social assistance. This position was kept intact when Venstre formed government with the Conservative People’s Party, save for one important difference: Venstre no longer argued for a unified benefit structure. 
Venstre’s policy on a one-tier benefit structure in the mid 1990s resembled the British Jobseekers Allowance. However, the party changed their approach significantly in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. As they presented More People Working (2002) they still advocated a one-tier employment service, but now gave up their wishes for a one tier benefit structure a´ la Jobseekers Allowance. This shift can be explained by the fact that the Liberal-Conservative government wanted a large majority to pass the reform, and the support of the social partners (Goul Andersen and Albrekt Larsen, 2004). What changed in the position of Venstre regarding a one-tier structure was that they ended up accepting that the benefit structure remained organised in two tiers. 

To sum up the analysis so far, we can ask again: How was agreement on the preferability of a one-tier structure for the labour market achieved between Venstre and the Social Democrats? The short answer is that the ideas in the jobcentre concept represent modifications that were necessary for the two parties to reach agreement on a one-tier system. First, the idea of individualisation plays a very significant part in the argument for a jobcentre reform; it is not the traditional Liberal-Conservative conception of individualisation as a matter of sufficient (economic) incentives. Rather, the reform builds on the Social Democratic version of individualisation with a combined focus on motivation and the needs of unemployed people on an individual basis. 
Second, the argument for a one-tier structure was supported by the idea ‘Equal status of the unemployed’: Insured and uninsured unemployed people are not fundamentally different, so why uphold an administrative structure for each? To convince the Social Democrats that a one-tier structure was preferable, the Liberal-Conservative government coupled the Social Democratic idea of individualisation to the idea ‘Equal status of the unemployed’. In this process the Liberal-Conservative government had to give up their wish for a one-tier benefit structure to get a one-tier employment service. 
In other words, the process of building consensus was dominated by the need for building on previous ideas and changing their meaning by coupling them to new ones. In the next section we will analyse how it was possible for the Liberal-Conservative government to use these ideational strategies and what it tells us about the relationship between ideas and actors.

The ideational reasons why consensus was reached

The process of reaching consensus on a one-tier structure analysed above illustrates how ideas can be used as a weapon in policy processes, but also how these weapons have to be used with due respect for the ideational structure that the idea are part of. To restate the question we are trying to answer: How was it possible to reach consensus, considering that the Social Democrats originally opposed the idea of a one-tier structure? The question needs an answer from two perspectives, namely from the perspective of Venstre and the Social Democrats respectively.
First, Venstre was able to use the two ideas, ‘Individualisation’ and ‘Equal status of the unemployed’, to create a strong argument for a one-tier structure. When the Social Democrats advocated for an individualised effort during the 1990s, they did not conclude that a one-tier structure was preferable. Instead, they argued that the two groups, insured and uninsured clients, were so different that they should be handled within two separate institutional structures. In other words, Venstre needed another argument that would convince the Social Democrats that a one-tier structure was the best solution to get people in employment. The solution became the idea ‘Equal status of the unemployed’. 
How then did Venstre use the idea ‘Equal status of the unemployed’ as a weapon? As mentioned earlier, because the meaning of an idea is created from the network of ideas it is part of, the meaning of an idea is changed if the network changes. This happened in the case of the Danish jobcentre reform. Venstre coupled the idea ‘Equal status of the unemployed’ with the idea ‘Individualisation’. This had the effect that the network ‘Individualisation’ was part of changed, and thus the meaning of ‘Individualisation’ also changed. Before the two ideas were coupled by Venstre, the question of a personalised employment service was not connected to the institutional structure of the employment service. The idea of ‘Equal status of the unemployed’ could thus be used to change the network of ideas that ‘Individualisation’ was part of.
However, Venstre’s top politicians could not simply use the ideas as they saw fit. Venstre had to frame its proposal for a one-tier structure within the existing ideational framework of ‘Individualisation’ as well as Danish labour market policy more generally. This means that it was necessary to use an idea that did not conflict too much with how the idea of ‘Individualisation’ was first conceived by the Social Democrats or Danish labour market policy more generally. The solution to this problem was to change Venstre’s original argument for a one-tier structure (anti-bureaucracy) to an argument of individualisation and in the process drop the proposal for a one-tier benefit structure. To successfully argue for a one-tier structure it was necessary to appropriate the ideas to the existing ideational structure of Danish labour market policy.
The question still remains, why the Social Democrats accepted the new meaning of ‘Individualisation’. On the face of it, nothing forced the Social Democrats to follow the Liberal-Conservative government in this new interpretation. Principally, the Social Democrats could keep up their interpretation of ‘Individualisation’. One important reason was probably that the Social Democrats wanted to be part of the reform negotiations (Christiansen and Klitgaard, 2008). But this alone does not explain why the Social Democrats changed position. They did after all leave the negotiations and still supported a one-tier structure. What is more likely is that the Social Democrats accepted Venstre’s argument, because it was built on a Social Democratic foundation of ‘Individualisation’. This is important for the Social Democrats, both because it makes it easier for them to support the argument, but also because it creates legitimacy around their own idea of ‘Individualisation’ and thus Social Democratic policy during the 1990s. Had the Social Democrats rejected the coupling between the two ideas it would also be hard not to reject the idea of ‘Individualisation’ itself. In this way, the semantic openness of ‘Individualisation’ to the idea of ‘Equal status of the unemployed’ made it difficult for the Social Democrats to reject the coupling without rejecting their own conception of ‘Individualisation’.

Conclusion

The empirical analysis of the Danish jobcentre reform showed that the process of reaching consensus about the preferability of a one-tier structure was affected by the dynamic relationship between actors and ideas. Actors used ideas – both to legitimize and create the content of the reform – but the weapon had to be used with due respect for the ideational environment of Danish labour market policy. An important strategy for Venstre was to build their argument for a one-tier structure on Social Democratic ideas, thus getting the Social Democrats to accept the argument, though it was not in their immediate interest, and at the same time change the meaning of the Social Democratic idea of ‘Individualisation’.
The analysis supports the argument that ideas work dynamically. It is not a question of whether ideas, actors or material structures have the power. Rather, it is necessary to recognise the dynamic relationship between each. The analysis demonstrated how neither ideas nor actors were in control. What we saw instead was an interrelationship between the two. The actors did not just use ideas as they saw fit. At the same time, however, the actors were not helplessly left to accept the existing ideational structure. When we acknowledge that ideas are made as they are used – and thus not closed entities – it is possible to appreciate how ideas are neither controllable nor uncontrollable. Instead their meaning and influence is determined by an interrelationship between how agents use them and their historical background.
The recognition that ideas and their internal structures are independent explanatory variables, naturally leads to an argument for further developing a theory of the nature of ideas, not least when investigating the role of ideas in policy reforms. It is a truism that social scientific analyses are affected by the direction we look in, so it can seem surprising how ideational analyses insist on not developing a theory about their central variable, ideas. This indirectly leads to overemphasising the role of actors over ideas. In this paper we are not proposing a unified theory about ideas, and it is not necessarily either possible or desirable to develop such a theory. However, any analysis that deals with ideas need to contain a specification of how ideas work and how ideas theoretically and analytically relate to other central variables such as material structures or actors. In other words: we need to know more about the nature of ideas to determine the political significance of ideas.
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Notes
1. However, in practice the centres are not totally unified. The reform ended up creating a divided responsibility between the municipalities and the state within the jobcentres. Municipal case managers have the responsibility for uninsured clients, whereas state employees handle insured clients.  

2. The government and the opposition were not able to reach an agreement in the negotiations. Instead, the government made an agreement with their supporting party, the Danish People’s Party, that the responsibility be shared between the state and the municipalities.

3. An important part of the agenda setting process took place in relation to previous labour market reform, the ‘More People Working’-reform (Flere i arbejde) of 2002. The More People Working-reform aimed at harmonising measures for reintegrating insured and uninsured clients. However, at this point the Liberal-Conservative government and the Social Democratic opposition had only reached agreement on harmonising activation measures etc. on a policy level. Disagreement still existed over the question of unifying the two tiers on an institutional level. In the agenda setting process leading up to the jobcentre reform, the government and opposition ended up agreeing that an institutional unification of the two systems was desirable.

4. Paradoxically, studies of the implementation of the Danish jobcentre reform reveals that in practice the reform has led to just the opposite: less individualisation. The reason is an increase in the use of standard procedures in the jobcentres and a separation between social issues and employment related issues (Seeman et al., forthcoming).

5. A significant part of the members of the commission were representatives of the social partners which served to legitimize the commission’s proposals.

6. Lars Løkke Rasmussen would in 2001 become Minister of the Interior in the Liberal-Conservative government, and he is considered the main architect behind the Structural Reform that the jobcentre-reform was part of.
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